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The 47 Percent: U.S. Trends in Income  
Maintenance and Medicaid Spending, 1990-2011
elgin Mannion
gordon c. chang
We analyze trends and variations in state-level expenditure 
growth for Medicaid, SSI, SNAP, and TANF. We explore three 
areas of interest: (1) How program structure impacts growth; 
(2) How programs responded to the 2008/2009 recession; and (3) 
How state preference for limited government, measured by Right-
To-Work (RTW) status and political affiliation, impacts program 
expenditure growth. Findings show that program structure im-
pacts expenditure growth: the state-matched programs like TANF 
and Medicaid grew slower from 1990-2011 than did open-ended 
federal programs like SNAP. OLS models found states with RTW 
policies and large Hispanic populations positively associated with 
higher income maintenance and Medicaid expenditure growth. 
Key words: income maintenance, Medicaid, program expenditure 
growth, limited government, political affiliation, right-to-work 
status, Hispanic populations 
All Western industrial governments re-distribute the na-
tional product through a variety of programs, for a variety of 
purposes (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004). While the United States is 
relatively more restrained than comparable nations in devel-
oping its welfare institutions, programs directed to serving the 
bottom quartile of the population have been the target of per-
sistent criticism. Means-tested programs without an income 
stream have generally been the object of the most vocal calls 
for cutbacks and reforms. Opponents point to the continously 
increasing enrollment numbers and expenditures, possibly re-
sulting in a national pattern of dependency (Eberstadt, 2012). 
The 2012 Presidential election campaign exposed the deep 
political cleavages concerning government transfer payments 
targeted to the poor. Mitt Romney markedly said, at a private 
fundraiser on May 17, 2012, that 47% of Americans paid zero 
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federal income tax and were thus “dependent upon govern-
ment” and “will vote for the president no matter what” (see 
Mother Jones News Team, 2012). 
Post election, attacks on transfer programs are represent-
ed in the recent legislation, The Nutrition Reform and Work 
Opportunity Act of 2013 (H.R. 3102, 2013). In an unprecedented 
move, the Bill decoupled the Food Stamp or SNAP programs 
from the Farm Bill, potentially increasing its political vulner-
ability (H.R. 3102, 2013; House Committee on Agriculture, 
2013). The bill proposes to downsize the SNAP program over 
the 2014-2023 periods, reducing funding by $40 billion and en-
rollment by 14 million. In addition, the bill contains sweep-
ing changes to how the program operates. The Southerland 
Amendment to the bill proposes to reinstate the asset and 
income tests and work requirements, to eliminate state perfor-
mance bonuses, actually providing incentives to states to cut 
program participation (Rogers, 2013). The bill further propos-
es lifetime bans for felons, drug testing of recipients by states, 
sanctioning of USDA and state staff for promoting the program, 
and, most importantly, shifting the burden of funding to state 
governments. Vocal advocates of block grants cite the advan-
tages of greater state control and autonomy, and the potential 
for national and regional budget savings (Stenberg, 2008; see 
also Dilger & Boyd, 2013). Opponents to the proposed reform 
of SNAP (and Medicaid) into block grants argue that they may 
lead to deep cuts to the most needy populations, less oversight 
(Waller, 2005), and may increase the political vulnerability of 
the program (Pavetti & Schott, 2011). 
In order to help inform the increasingly polarized debate 
about the future of means-tested programs, we analyze the 
general trends and variations in state-level expenditure 
growth for Medicaid, SSI, SNAP, and TANF, the programs tar-
geted to poverty groups that do not have an income stream. 
We explore the following issues that may affect expenditure 
growth: (1) Program structure: Current legislation proposes to 
turn SNAP into flat-funded state block grants, and block grant 
reform for Medicaid is in debate. Does program structure 
(joint state/federal or federally funded) affect state spending 
levels? (2) Program flexibility and utility: Income maintenance 
programs are intended to provide a safety need for needy 
populations. How well did the four programs respond to the 
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2008/2009 recession? (3) Political preference and economic policy: 
Does the preference for small government inform state-level 
redistributive policies, and result in slower growth and lower 
expenditures for means-tested programs at the state level? Do 
business-friendly, state-level economic policies, namely Right-
to-Work (RTW) legislation, influence the state-level program 
expenditure? 
Income Maintenance: Important Safety Net,  
or Political “Gifts” and Efficiency Drain?
President Kennedy (1962) once remarked about fiscal 
policy: “the myths are legion and the truths hard to find.” The 
ideological divide over income maintenance programs cuts 
to the core of what type of society and size of government 
is considered desirable, and what fiscal strategy best fosters 
economic growth, with little or no common ground. From the 
progressive perspective, the income distribution is a “public 
good” (Thurow, 1971). Income maintenance programs provide 
an important safety net for the needy and result in a more 
equitable distribution (Cassiman, 2008; see also Calvo, 2011). 
While some short-term effects may be observed, they do not 
necessarily encourage long-term dependency (e.g., Vartanian, 
Houser, & Harkness, 2011). Governments redistribute re-
sources to the poor for the political purposes of stability and 
equity (Okun, 1975; Thurow, 1971) or the objectives of stimu-
lating aggregate demand in economic downturns (Romer & 
Bernstein, 2009; Weber, 2000; Zandi, 2008). From the Keynesian 
perspective (Keynes, 1964), transfer payments along with gov-
ernment purchases and tax cuts are important fiscal tools for 
government to deploy in times of economic contraction, cre-
ating a “floor” beneath which aggregate demand cannot fall. 
Tax cuts and transfer payments are best targeted to the middle 
and lower end of the distribution rather than the top, as they 
are more likely to immediately consume. Roosevelt’s New 
Deal and the Kennedy and Johnson administration’s “War on 
Poverty” programs subscribed to this theory of active govern-
ment intervention in the economy, creating the very poverty 
programs now so hotly contested. 
By contrast, the “classical” economic tradition prefers a 
minimalist model of state intervention. Resources need to 
be shifted to those in the position to efficiently use them, the 
“savings class,” or in new parlance, the “job creators” (Bradley 
& Rector, 2010; Mankiw, 2013). Fiscal policy focused on deficit 
spending measurably impairs economic growth (Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2010) by reducing labor market flexibility and diverting 
scarce sources from productive use (Gylfason, 1999). Personal 
government transfers “leak” economic efficiency and stifle in-
novation (Mankiw, 2013; Okun, 1975) in the misguided quest 
for equity. From the Public Choice Perspective (Buchanon & 
Tullock, 1962), income maintenance programs are examples of 
the “disease of democracy” (Rowley, 1993). They constitute, 
in Romney’s words, the political “gifts” (quoted in Berman, 
2012) to voters that actively create the notorious 47%, or the 
“rent seeking” government-transfer-dependent populations 
(Becker, 1985). A Nation of Takers by Nicholas Eberstadt (2012) 
is a recent, widely publicized restatement of this argument, 
finding exponential growth in transfer payment from 1960 to 
2010.
Such a preference for limited government, a quest for 
Federalist state autonomy, informs the debate on devolving 
programs such as SNAP and Medicaid into flat-funded block 
grants. The literature on the desirability of means-tested block 
grants as a model for income maintenance is divided. Block 
grants are fixed amounts (Dilger & Boyd, 2013), and are thus 
viewed as an aid in trimming costs on the local and federal 
level, as noted by Senator Paul Ryan. Block grants give the 
states, which are purportedly best qualified for local problem-
solving, the needed flexibility to do so without the federal 
strings attached. They differ in legal status from open-ended 
entitlements structured like SNAP and Medicaid, which create 
individual “rights” to benefits that can be litigated (King, 2000; 
Melnick, 1994). Opponents point to incidences where states' 
broad flexibility can divert funding from the needy (Posner & 
Wrightson, 1996) and lack the effective, mandatory program 
oversight built into entitlement programs (Waller, 2005). 
Recent policy innovations by conservative governors at 
the state-level target entitlement reforms (Malanga, 2013). The 
combination of state budget shortfalls and vocal political aver-
sion to redistributive programs creates a renewed need for 
comprehensive, comparative analysis of state-level funding 
and policy outcomes. The existing literature identifies major 
28    Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
factors explaining state-level variations in social spending. 
Economic factors identified include per capita incomes and a 
state’s fiscal and revenue capacity (Holcombe & Stroup, 1996). 
Interestingly, states with less fiscal capacity spend less on social 
programs, despite federal grants, and use less of their own re-
sources (Dilger, 1998; The Lewin Group, 2004). Most studies 
do not find a link between political culture, executive party 
control at the state-level, and state spending levels (Dilger, 
1998; Holcombe & Stroup, 1996), with a few exceptions (Elazar, 
1966; Hager & Talbert, 2000). 
We explore an added political and economic proxy measure 
of interest to capture state-level preference of limited govern-
ment and pro-business policies, the individual states’ Right-to 
Work status. Currently, 23 states have RTW laws, with Indiana 
becoming the most recent RTW state in February 2012. RTW 
legislations generally outlaw “union security” clauses, man-
dating workers in a collectively bargained contract to pay a 
share of the cost for union representation. RTW laws by them-
selves alone may have little effect on shaping economic perfor-
mance, but they are a proxy of a vast array of “business friend-
ly” measures that states have adopted to increase labor market 
flexibility, such as low tax rates, cash incentives for relocation, 
and lax environmental and safety regulations (Holmes, 2000; 
Lafer & Allegretto, 2011). Central to RTW policies is control of 
labor costs, and RTW states generally have lower per capita 
personal incomes (Gallagher, 2012). 
Historical Background of U.S.  
Means-Tested Transfer Programs
In American public political discourse, the neutral term 
“transfers” has long been abandoned in the fight to curb gov-
ernment spending (Lind, 2012). Rather than transfers, more 
ideologically loaded terms like “welfare” or “entitlements” 
are generally used when discussing the future of redistribu-
tive programs. “Entitlements” generally refer to those pro-
grams that have been paid into by individuals through payroll 
taxes, such as Social Security, Medicare, Veteran’s benefits 
and Workmen’s compensation. “Welfare” refers to programs 
that are need-based and “means-tested” (Rector, 2012), and is 
defined by the Department of Commerce as “benefits received 
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for which no current service is performed” (Eberstadt, 2012). 
The cash program Earned Income Tax Credit, a subsidy for 
low-wage earners, is not part of this group due to work re-
quirements, and therefore is not included in our analysis. 
These means-tested programs make an easy target politi-
cally. Proposed cuts resonate well with a predictable base of 
voters. These programs are not represented by an effective 
lobby as are Social Security, Medicare, and Farm Subsidies. 
Proposing cuts thus generally does not incur political risks 
(Derthick & Teles, 2003). The four programs that fit this de-
scription are TANF (Temporary Aid for Needy Families) cash 
payments, the target of the 1996 Clinton PWRORA Welfare 
Reform; SSI (Supplemental Security Income) disability pay-
ments; SNAP, the Food Stamp Program; and Medicaid, 
medical care targeted to low income populations. Politically 
important, they have different funding streams: TANF and 
Medicaid are joint Federal/State programs, whereas SSI and 
SNAP are federally funded only. 
The TANF/ADFC (Temporary Aid for Needy Families, 
formerly Aid to Dependent Families and Children) program 
consists mainly of cash assistance. It was created in 1935 as 
part of the Social Security Act, intended for “orphans” missing 
one or both parents. It was considered, in the context of the 
Great Depression, more advantageous to aid widows than 
have them take scarce jobs from male breadwinners (Trattner, 
1999). This program was funded by states receiving unlimited 
Federal funds with matching state grants for eligible families. 
The program was generally disliked, often on moral grounds 
of encouraging out-of-wedlock birth. As individual states 
had the power to set the levels, 19 states passed legislation 
in the 1950s to exclude “undeserving” families such as single 
mothers and African Americans (Howard, 2007; Trattner, 
1999). The continual program growth during the 1960s-
1980s period generated further criticisms. Critics blamed the 
program for a variety of social ills such as the rise of single 
heads of households and family dissolution (Murray, 1984). 
The widespread criticism led to the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) 
(P.L. 104-193, 1996). The 1996 Welfare reform for TANF under 
Clinton set time limits, added work requirements, and focused 
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on reducing unmarried births. Today, a large portion is given to 
children directly. Matched maintenance-of-effort requirement 
(MOE) fixed-amount block grants can be used in a variety of 
ways other than cash payments to clients. Only about 41% is 
spent on cash payments; the remainder is spent on childcare, 
job training, and transportation (Falk, 2013). Currently, TANF 
has not been reauthorized since 2010, and states have had to 
rely on short-term block grant extensions. Waivers granted by 
the Department of Health and Human Services to help with 
some of the more stringent work requirements have not been 
used by any state (Falk, 2013). 
SSI (Supplemental Security Income) was originally an 
amendment to the Social Security Act, created by Nixon in 
1972 to standardize payments to the blind and disabled that 
were considered inefficient and unfair. A federal program 
funded by general taxes rather than social security taxes, the 
program experienced rapid expansion in the 1990s. The rapid 
growth for SSI also led to reform under PRWORA, restricting 
eligibility in cases of drug and alcohol addiction, childhood 
disability, and excluding aliens (Berkowitz & Dewitt, 2013). 
Today, clients' assets must not exceed 2000 dollars. 
The Food Stamp program, or SNAP, was started in 1939 by 
USDA director Henry Wallace to put agricultural surpluses to 
use during the depression. The program ended in 1939. During 
the Johnson Administration, the program was reauthorized 
and fully funded through the Food Stamp Act of 1964, which 
also contained price subsidies for a variety of commodities. The 
program, which can be waived by states, generally expanded 
until the 1996 PRWORA legislation, which also imposed time 
limits on able-bodied adults. Both Food Stamps and subsidies 
were historically used as leverage to reach compromise on 
each Farm bill, until the recent decoupling from the House. 
The George W. Bush administration’s 2002 Farm Bill made it 
easier for states to administer the program to recipients, and the 
2008 Farm Bill increased benefit levels (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2012). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 (ARRA) (P.L. 111–5, 2009) used $45 billion to expand 
SNAP benefits. Forty-six states took advantage of the waiver 
during the 2008/2009 recession (Robertson, 2012).
Medicaid is by far the largest expenditure of the four 
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programs (see Table 2). Medicaid was created 1965 by the 
Johnson Administration by amending the Social Security Act as 
an entitlement program to help states provide medical cover-
age for low-income families (Katz, 1996). States have to match 
up to half the federal funds (the average is 57%), and states 
may bundle benefits with S-CHIP, the program that assists 
with children’s health care. Federal payments vary from state 
to state, according to state per capita income, ranging from 
50-82% federal matching (Kaiser Family Foundation, n.d.). 
Most states choose to use private providers and establish their 
own rates for providers. As cost and enrollment have steadily 
grown, states have cut pay to providers and tightened eligi-
bility. Medicaid funding has become a major budgetary item 
for many states in fiscal crisis, with states spending 18-20% of 
state budget on the program. In 2012, 13 states cut Medicaid to 
balance their budgets (Kaiser Health News, 2012). As part of 
the Affordable Care Act, starting in 2014, people with income 
of up to 133% of the poverty line can qualify for coverage, in-
cluding adults without dependent children. State governors 
who opposed the Affordable Care Act did not participate in 
the Medicaid expansion. 
The cash program Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was 
initiated by Gerald Ford in 1975 and expanded and indexed 
to inflation by Ronald Reagan in 1986 (Alstott, 2010). The 
program eliminates the income tax liability of low-income 
workers, an idea originally credited to Milton Friedman. 
Twenty-seven million income tax filers received $63 billion in 
federal refundable credits in the tax year 2012 (Flores, 2014). 
The EITC is thus a costly program which leads to errors on 
tax returns (Faler, 2014). The program is also implicated in cre-
ating disincentives to marriage and work, and increasing the 
ranks of people exempt from tax liabilities (Alstott, 2010; Faler, 
2014). However, the work requirements and Republican heri-
tage of the program have made it largely exempt from attacks, 
and there is currently no pending legislation for EITC program 
reforms. 
Methods
Our investigation is informed by the following research 
questions: 
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1. Does the Federal or state-matched structure of the 
program influence program spending?
2. How well did the programs respond to the 2008/2009 
recession?
3. How does political affiliation and associated 
economic policies influence the state-level program 
expenditure?
To address the first question, we analyze state and re-
gional trends in enrollments and expenditures, and calculate 
state and regional variations in program expenditures through 
continuously compounded growth rates, commonly used for 
population growth, compound interest, and forecasting. We 
calculate growth rates for the years 1999-2011, the last avail-
able date from the same time series, and growth rates for the 
last and current administrations 2000-2008, and 2008-2011. 
Some authors of the most alarmist transfer payment program 
growth rates (Eberstadt, 2012) have not clearly disclosed what 
type of technique they used to calculate the resulting numbers. 
In all likelihood, the high rates of growth were calculated 
through relative change. Relative deltas calculate the differ-
ence as a percent of the base value between two end points, 
and thus can overestimate growth among high values, and 
respond poorly to negative numbers, which the programs 
such as SSI, TANF have had in many years in the last decades. 
In contrast, continuously compounded growth rates take the 
natural log. The number of compounding periods per year in-
creases without limit, the continuous compounding referred to 
in the term.1 The natural log (ln) is the effective annual rate 
of growth, the amount of time needed to reach a certain level 
of continuous growth. This measure is preferable, since vari-
ables like expenditure, GDP, and population growths are often 
exponential and non-linear. This measure is also preferable to 
relative-change percentages because the rise and fall of growth 
rates are not symmetrical. 
 For regions, we use the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
operational definition of U.S. regions. We calculate yearly rates 
of change for the program expenditures for Medicaid, SNAP, 
TANF and SSI, from BEA’s time series record of “Personal 
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Current Personal Transfer Receipts (SA-35) (U. S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, n.d.).
In order to assess programs’ responses to the 2008/2009 
recession, we calculate a yearly rate of change for real GDP, 
Medicaid, SNAP, SSI and Medicaid for the years 1997-2011. 
We compare and plot the yearly program change against GDP. 
We adjust all the required time series for constant dollars with 
GDP deflators, also available from the BEA. 
In order to study the relationship between political affilia-
tion and associated economic policies and state-level program 
expenditure, we construct an OLS regression model. The 
model tests the hypothesis that the rhetoric of a small-state 
footprint, advocated more by proponents of RTW legislations 
and Republican leadership, is indeed implemented in state-
level practice. In other words, RTW status and political affilia-
tion with the Republican Party is hypothesized to be negative-
ly associated with means-tested transfers, as we have assumed 
that the preference for a small government informs state-level 
redistributive policies. RTW status has been used in previous 
studies as a proxy for business friendly policies, specifically 
increased labor market flexibility, and less regulation (Holmes, 
2000; Lafer & Allegretto, 2011; Zullo, 2011). The composite 
measure “Income Maintenance” from the BEA includes TANF 
and SNAP, as well as some other smaller programs such as 
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); total Medicaid amounts 
from the BEA are the outcome variables. We do not model 
TANF and SSI individually, as the expenditures are relatively 
small in comparison to SNAP and Medicaid. 
The two outcome variables are modeled as a 1990-2011 
growth rate, and Medicaid as a capita amount in 2011 (per 
capita income maintenance is too small an amount to have 
an effect). Explanatory variables modeled are: 2011 popula-
tion, continuously compounded Income Growth (as measured 
by growth in Per Capita Personal Income) and GDP growth 
(U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, n.d.), percent of all ages in 
poverty in 2011, percent of African Americans in 2011, percent 
of Hispanics in 2011 (http://www. census.gov/), regional 
dummies for the BEA regions, a dummy for Republican mea-
sured by voters’ preference in the U.S. Electoral College in the 
last four consecutive Presidential elections (2000-2012) (which 
captures consistent “red” states), and a Right-to-Work dummy 
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to control for states’ preference for business friendly policies 
and labor market flexibility. Indiana is not treated as a RTW 
state in our paper due to the data years we analyze. Our study 
is limited by the very broad measures of political affiliation 
and economic performance used. More differentiated mea-
sures for state-level economic performance, such as exports, 
sectorial composition, and measures that capture recent policy 
innovations need to be developed for useful comparisons.
Results
General Description and Overview
In order to determine how spending on income mainte-
nance programs and Medicaid compare across states, we look 
at all government transfers as a percentage of personal income. 
The percentage of all government transfers in income range 
from 12% (North Dakota) to 26% (West Virginia). In 22 states, 
government transfers do constitute nearly a fifth of income, 
ranging from 19-26%. Total income maintenance, however, 
only ranges from 3% to 1% of personal incomes in the 50 states. 
Pensions, Disability and Social Security constitute the larger 
percentage of personal income, ranging from 5-8% of personal 
income. Medicare ranges from 1-5% of personal income, and 
Medicaid from 1-3% (not shown in Table). With the exception 
of Maine, the remaining 10 states where government trans-
fers are above 20% have poverty rates well above the national 
average of 15.9% and high percentages of minority popula-
tions (see Table 1). 
Currently, thirteen states have slashed Medicaid and other 
matched programs to balance strained budgets (Kaiser Health 
News, 2012). Programs intended for low income populations 
are targeted for cuts in national and state budget proposals. 
Continuously compounded growth rates from 1990-2011 show 
a decline for both TANF and SSI, the programs targeted by 
welfare reform in 1996. We find 6% growth for Medicaid and 
8% growth for SNAP. Enrollment for programs ranges from a 
low of 1.5% and 2.5% of the U. S. population for TANF and SSI, 
and 14.4% for SNAP. Medicaid by far has the highest program 
expenditures, as well as largest enrollments at 17% of the pop-
ulation (see Table 2). 
The growth rates show an interesting political effect that 
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responds to our research question whether program structure 
affects spending levels. Programs that require state funding 
grew slower both in dollar amounts and enrollments (enroll-
ment growth not shown). The Federal program SNAP experi-
enced the most growth, whereas the state-matched program 
TANF declined from 1990-2012, and Medicaid grew modestly. 
It is important to note that while Medicaid expenditures grew 
even faster than SNAP, it did not significantly grow in enroll-
ment between 1990-2011. The Medicaid expenditure growth 
was primarily driven by dramaticly rising costs of healthcare, 
a widely-noted phenomenon (Jacobs & Skocpol, 2002), as state 
governments have continuously restricted eligibility and cut 
cost to providers. 
Table 1. Government Transfers as Percent of Personal Income 2012.
State
All Govt. 
Transfers 
% of 
Pers. 
Income
Income 
Maint.
% of Pers. 
Income
% in 
Poverty
% African 
American 
Population
% Hispanic 
Population
West 
Virginia 0.26 0.03 18 3.2 0.7
Mississippi 0.24 0.03 23.8 36 1.4
Arkansas 0.23 0.02 19.6 15.5 3.2
Kentucky 0.22 0.03 19.3 7.2 1.5
Alabama 0.22 0.03 19 29.2 1.7
South 
Carolina 0.22 0.03 18.3 28.9 2.4
Maine 0.22 0.02 14.4 0.5 0.7
Michigan 0.21 0.03 17.4 14.1 3.3
New 
Mexico 0.21 0.03 20.6 13.3 42.1
Tennessee 0.20 0.03 18 16.1 2.2
Arizona 0.20 0.02 18.7 5 25.3
The yearly rate of change in dollar values for the last 
three decades similarly shows different patterns for matched 
and federally funded programs. Medicaid growth has 
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generally been below 10%, barring the flexibility expansions 
under President Bush in 2001. TANF growth since the 1996 
welfare reform, barring the extra ARRA funding during the 
recession, has been a modest 2-3%, with 10 years of the 30 
showing declines in funding. 
Table 2. Program Participation, Average Monthly Benefit, and 
Expenditure Growth Rates, 1990-2011.
Program
Amount
(in 
billions)
Average
Monthly 
Benefit
Enrollment
2011 (in 
milliions)
% of U.S. 
Population
Type of 
Program
Growth 
1990-
2011 
Cont. 
Comp.
Growth 
1990-
2011
Rel. 
Change
SNAP 78 $287 45 14.4% Federal 8% 228%
TANF 30.6 $378 4.6 1.5% State/federal -1% -28%
SSI 47 $478 7.7 2.5% Federal -2% 101%
Medicaid 404.1 $6,775 52.9 17.0% State/federal 6% 244%
Growth for federally-funded programs, unlike TANF and 
Medicaid, is positive for the three decades. Growth for SSI 
expenditures since the 1990s has mostly ranged from 2-6% 
following the restrictions from the 1996 welfare reform (see 
also Table 3). With the exception of 1996 welfare reform, the 
open-ended Federal program, SNAP, has grown rather quickly 
both under the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. 
Clearly, states have put the brakes on growth in programs that 
are partially states’ responsibilities and taken advantage of 
the easier access and program waivers instituted by the Bush 
and Obama administrations for Food Stamps. Looking at the 
growth of programs in U. S. states and regions, we find slightly 
higher growth for all four programs for the Rocky Mountain 
and Southwest regions, very likely due to the states that have 
high percentages of Hispanic populations. States such as 
Arizona (25.3%) Colorado (17.1%), New Mexico (42.1%), and 
Nevada (19.7%) are represented among the top ten in growth 
for these programs (tables showing individual rates of growth 
in states and regions available upon request). 
Are programs targeted to low-income populations respon-
sive to economic contractions, given the means-tested nature 
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of the programs? Given increased need in times of recessions 
and increasing unemployment, we would expect a decrease of 
programs in periods of economic expansion, and an increase 
in funding during the recent recession. Looking at program 
expenditure plotted to GDP yearly change, TANF and SNAP 
do respond to the 2008-2009 recession by expansion (see 
Figure 1). It is important to note that program expenditures 
were increased and access to the program eased legislatively 
by both the George W. Bush and the current administration’s 
expansion of the 2009 Recovery Act (ARRA). Medicaid and 
SSI, however, only moderately expanded in the 2000-2001 
and 2008-2009 recessions. During the 2008-2009 recession, SSI 
increased a modest 3.8%, and Medicaid 4.8%. Due to the re-
strictions placed on Medicaid, few adult people who lost their 
employer-based health care transferred to Medicaid. The in-
crease mainly reflected children covered (Holahan & Chen, 
2011). TANF and SNAP grew 7.2% and 28% respectively (see 
Table 3). 
Table 3. GDP, SSI, SNAP, TANF and Medicaid Expenditure Yearly 
Rate of Change, 1997-2012. 
Year GDP SSI SNAP TANF Medicaid
1997/1998 5.52 4.01 -12.1 -2.51 4.33
1998/1999 6.41 2.31 -6.02 2.82 8.44
1999/2000 6.43 2.1 -5.87 2.9 8.09
2000/2001 3.38 4.69 9.63 -1.81 13.92
2001/2002 3.47 4.53 16.57 -2.33 10.01
2002/2003 4.69 3.04 18.87 3.86 5.81
2003/2004 6.38 3.85 17.27 0.28 9.56
2004/2005 6.49 3.14 13.67 -0.34 5.04
2005/2006 5.98 4.29 -0.35 -0.7 -1.74
2006/2007 4.87 5.76 5.21 0.99 8.38
2007/2008 1.84 4.3 19.77 3.91 4.36
2008/2009 -2.28 8.1 47.87 11.18 9.14
2009/2011 3.74 3.32 21.46 5.44 7.42
2010/2011 3.97 2.41 9.34 -7.23 2.23
2011/2012 4.05 4.27 2.93 -3.31 2.86
Note: Data during and after the Great Recession years are italicized.
SSI, a relatively small program, tracks GDP growth almost 
perfectly, increasing during economic expansion, and contract-
ing along with economic downturns. These results indicate 
that Medicaid and SSI, programs that address healthcare and 
disability, were only moderately increased in times of econom-
ic downturns. SNAP, the open-ended federal program with the 
least restrictions in terms of eligibility, is the most expanded 
program in the 2008/2009 recession (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. GDP and Medicaid, SNAP, SSI and TANF % Yearly 
Change, 1997-2011
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Political and Economic Determinants of Expenditure Growth
Our analysis looks for evidence on how the purported 
preference for small government informs state-level redistrib-
utive policies, and whether business-friendly economic poli-
cies, namely RTW legislations, influence state-level program 
expenditure. 
Table 4 illustrates the effects of our main variables (i.e., 
RTW and Republican). In regression model I, the composite 
variable Income Maintenance Growth shows a positive, statisti-
cally significant effect of RTW legislations. This finding indi-
cates that the lower wages associated with RTW legislations 
generally need to be mitigated through increased transfer pay-
ments over time. 
Actually, RTW states also experience faster per capita 
Income Growth, which reduces Income Maintenance Growth. 
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However, this faster Income Growth is not enough to offset the 
overall impact of lower wages. Even when we remove Income 
Growth from our control model, RTW states still experience 
Table 4. Regression Coefficients for Income Maintenance Growth, 
Medicaid Growth, and Per Capita Medicaid Expenditure. 
Independent 
Variable
Model I Model II Model III
Income 
Maintenance 
Growth
Medicaid 
Growth
Per Capita 
Medicaid 2011
RTW Dummy 1.759***(.000)
.041 -.272*
(.035)
Republican .297 .202 -.043
BEA Regions .022 .183 -.066*(.017)
Population (in 
millions)
-.091***
(.001)
-.090**
(.004)
.011
% AA -.004 .018 .002
% Hispanic .056*(.012)
.100***
(.000)
-.003
Poverty -.069 -.033 .070*(.014)
Income Growth -1.838***(.000)
-1.082*
(.014) --
GDP Growth .013 .102 --
Log PCPI -- -- 1.162*(.035)
Log GDP -- -- -.131
Intercept 12.652***(.000)
9.318***
(.000)
-10.081
(.101)
R Square .643 .518 .502
Adjusted R2 .563 .410 .390
Note. * = p < .05. ** =  p < .01. *** = p < .001.
higher growth in income maintenance transfers (see model I in 
Table 5). One tangible reason is that per capita Income Growth 
is unevenly distributed by concentrating on the upper-income 
populations. Therefore, the results here suggest that, at a state 
level, pursuing higher, aggregate Income Growth by permitting 
lower wages and increased labor flexibility would likely lead 
to an aggregate increase in transfer payment needs in the state 
population in the long run. 
Per Capita Medicaid shows a significant but negative asso-
ciation with RTW dummy variable. This result indicates that 
RTW states tend to adopt the policy of cutting Medicaid. RTW 
legislations and Republican leadership are associated with 
lower personal incomes and higher poverty rates in most RTW 
states. Nine out of 10 states that occupied the lowest PCPI 
ranks in 2011 were all Republican states, and seven were RTW 
states. But the funding amount per capita is generally less in 
RTW states; indeed, model III shows this pattern to be true 
even when the poverty rate is controlled for. The lesser ex-
penditure thus clearly indicates a state-level policy preference 
rather than the extent of social need.
For a political effect, the variable Republican in the last four 
elections is not statistically significant with the dependent 
variables. The Republican variable becomes significant when 
we remove the RTW dummy variable, which is highly corre-
lated with Republican (r = .60, p=.000). Of the 24 Republican 
states, the following seven did not have RTW statuses as of 
2011: Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, 
and West Virginia. Of the 22 RTW states, the following three 
did not have four consecutive Republican administrations: 
Florida, Iowa, and Virginia. In a stepwise analysis not shown 
here, we find that the effects of RTW and Republican behave 
similarly when the other variable is not present, but RTW is 
a better predicator than Republican, yielding higher R square 
values in all models. RTW legislations may thus be a more im-
portant predictor on transfer payments patterns than political 
affiliations.
BEA Regions, specifically the prosperous Far West region, 
California, Washington and Oregon, is negatively associated 
with Per Capita Medicaid. This result indicates an interesting dif-
ference in those states’ willingness to fund Medicaid programs 
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compared to their Northeastern counterparts. Race has an inde-
pendent effect as well. Both the composite Income Maintenance 
Growth and Medicaid Growth variables are positively associated 
with Percent of Hispanic population. Individual states with high 
percentages of Hispanics are represented among the top ten 
in individual program growth expenditure (tabular data avail-
able upon request). These results cause concern: they indi-
cate that Hispanics are inadequately integrated into the labor 
market and require medical and income assistance.
These results have been checked against the potential risks 
posted by multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors 
(VIF) of all models in Table 4 are below 5.0, which is below the 
standard 10.0 threshold. In addition, we have run models by 
removing several highly correlated variables that are near or 
above .60—specifically, Log PCPI and Log GDP, which correlate 
with Poverty and Population respectively; Republican, which 
correlates with RTW Dummy at a .60 level; and Poverty, which 
correlates with Percent of African American. 
Conclusion
Where do we go from here in terms of reforms for means-
tested programs? In concrete terms, which policies and pro-
grams should receive support in the interest of a more equi-
table society? Our results show growth for the programs from 
1990-2011 has been relatively modest, with the exception of 
SNAP, the food stamp program. The structure of the program 
clearly affects program spending: the state matched programs 
of TANF and Medicaid grew modestly, and TANF has been 
in decline for many consecutive years. Clearly, states use pro-
grams they have to match less freely: forty-six governors of 
all political persuasions availed themselves of SNAP waivers 
during the recession. States visibly limited Medicaid spend-
ing: adjusted for inflation, growth for the U.S. was a modest 
six percent, and much, if not all, could be attributed to the rise 
in cost.
Given this context, turning SNAP into flat-funded state 
block grants, an effort repeatedly led by House Republican leg-
islators, would in all likelihood lead to consistently lower levels 
of funding and restrict the program’s accessibility. SNAP could 
possibly follow the TANF pattern of enrollment and funding 
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growth since 1996, a scenario that would in all likelihood in-
crease food insecurity among the most needy populations. In 
the recent recession, SNAP, the open-ended federal program, 
was the only program meaningfully expanded. TANF, SSI and 
Medicaid only moderately expanded. SNAP therefore has 
provided an important safety net for the needy, and should 
thus be vocally supported. What other program could be as re-
sponsive as SNAP to expand the safety net in economic down-
turns? State budget shortfalls and cutbacks targeting poverty 
programs will most likely continue in the foreseeable future, 
requiring continued need for a federal program. 
Income maintenance programs show an interesting geo-
graphical and political discrepancy between the need for 
poverty programs and the publicly-professed political aver-
sion. At the very heart of the debate over income maintenance 
programs is the argument that less focus on redistribution and 
more on business-friendly policies increases economic growth. 
Findings show the contrary: the lower wages associated with 
RTW policies are associated with increased income mainte-
nance growth and increased need for state-sponsored health 
care in the long term (even if the needs may not always be 
met). 
While such states may gain income growth for the upper-
class residents and labor flexibility, the system is inequitable 
because such gains need to be mitigated by all U.S. taxpayers 
through federal programs, burdening residents in non-RTW 
states disproportionately. These measures also seem to come 
with increased transfer payment dependency. Missouri and 
Michigan recently passed RTW legislations, and Pennsylvania 
and Alaska are the current battlegrounds for similar legisla-
tions. The push to pass RTW legislations should be resisted. 
Of special concern are states with large minority populations, 
specifically Hispanic populations, which show accelerated 
levels of income maintenance and state assisted medical care. 
The adoption of RTW laws, combined with cutbacks in state 
funding, would clearly affect these vulnerable populations. 
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Endnotes:
1. Growth N = N0  e
rt   . Where: r is the rate of natural increase. N0  
refers to the initial amount of expenditure. N is the amount of 
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expenditure after a certain time, t, has elapsed. e is the constant 2. 
71828... (the base of natural logarithms). As the Natural Log (ln) is 
the amount of time needed to reach a certain level of continuous 
growth, interpretation of the resulting number is straightforward, as 
it is the annual growth rate.
2. For example, the budget increase from $100 to $120 may be an 
increase of 20%, but for a subsequent budget cut from $120 to $100, 
the percentage change would be -16%. Assessing growth rates in 
fluctuating situations by taking a natural log would remedy the 
shortcoming: both ln(120/100) and ln(100/120) are symmetrical 
(0.1823 and -0.1823, respectively). This measure thus offers more 
precision for our assessment.
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